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Abstract
Financial crisis are often associated with an endogenous credit reversal fol-
lowed by a fall in asset prices and failures of ￿nancial institutions. To account
for this sequence of events, this paper constructs a model where the excess
risk-taking of portfolio investors leads to a bubble in asset prices (in the spirit
of Allen and Gale, Economic Journal, 2000), and where the supply of credit to
these investors is endogenous. First, we show that changes in the composition
and riskiness of investors￿portfolio as total lending varies may cause the ex ante
return on loans to increase with the amount of total lending, thereby creating
the potential for multiple (Pareto-ranked) equilibria associated with di⁄erent
levels of lending, asset prices, and output. We then embed this mechanism into
a 3-period model where the low-lending equilibrium is selected with positive
probability at the intermediate date. This event is associated with a ine¢ cient
liquidity dry-up, a market crash, and widespread failures of borrowers.
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11 Introduction
The resurgence of ￿nancial crises in the ￿fteen years, both in OECD and emerg-
ing contries, has sparked a renewal of interest in the potential sources of ￿nancial
fragility and market imperfections in which they originate. Although each crisis had,
of course, its own speci￿cities (depending, in particular, on the variety of exchange
rate regimes that were adopted), it is now widely agreed that they all were charac-
terised by a typical underlying pattern involving destabilising developments in credit
and asset markets. Amongst OECD countries in the 80s and early 90s, like Japan
or Scandinavian countries, ￿nancial crises were an integral part of a broader ￿ credit
cycle￿ , whereby ￿nancial deregulation led to an increased amount of available credit,
fulled a period of overinvestment in real estate and the stock market, leading to ex-
cessive asset-price in￿ ation. These events were then followed by a credit contraction
(or ￿ crunch￿ ), the bursting of the asset bubble, causing the actual or near bankrupcy
of the ￿nancial institutions which had previously borrowed to buy them (see Borio
et al. (1994), Allen and Gale (1999) for a more detailed account of these events). In
many emerging countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America, capital account lib-
eralisation allowed large in￿ ows of capital, with a similar e⁄ect of raising asset prices
to unsustainable levels; This phase of overlending usually ended in a brutal capital
account reversal from large de￿cits to small ones (or sometimes small surpluses), ac-
companied by a market crash and a banking crisis, also often (but not necessarily)
coupled with the collapse of the prevailing exchange rate regime (see Kaminsky and
Rheinart (1998, 1999), and Calvo (1998) for the evidence on this typical pattern,
sometimes referred to as ￿ sudden stop￿ ).
An important theoretical issue, yet largely unsanswered, is whether the credit
reversal that typically accompanies such crisis is the outcome of an autonomous, ex-
trinsic, reversal of expectations on the part of economic agents, or simply the natural
outcome of building up macroeconomic imbalances and/or policy mistakes, i.e., the
intrinsic fundamentals of the economy. For a time, it has been fashionable to inter-
pret ￿nancial crisis as the mere outcome of extraneous ￿ sunspots￿hitting the beliefs
of investors, regardless of the underlying fundamental soundness of the economy. For
example, early models of banking crises would emphasise the inherent instability of
the banking system, whose provision of liquidity insurrance made them sensitive to
self-ful￿lling runs, as the ultimate source of vulnerability to crises (see Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), and Chang and Velasco (2000) for an open economy version of a sim-
2ilar model). In a similar vein, ￿ second-generation￿models of currency crisis would
insist on the potential existence of multiple equilibria in models of exchange rate
determination, where the defense of a pre-announced peg by the central bank is too
costly to be fully credible ￿see, for example, Velasco (1996) and Obsfeld (1996)).
Although expectational factors certainly play a r￿le in triggering ￿nancial crises,
theories based purely on self-ful￿lling expectations clearly do not tell the full story. In
virtually all the recent episodes that we just brie￿ y refered to, speci￿c macroeconomic
or structural sources of fragility preceded the actual occurrence of the crisis. In OECD
countries, for example, ￿nancial crises usually followed periods of excessively loose
monetary policy and/or poor exchange rate management (see Borio et al. (1994)). In
emerging countries, the culprit was often to be found in the weakness of the banking
sector due to poor ￿nancial regulation, as well as other factors such as unsustainable
￿scal or exchange rate policies (Summers (2000)). In the speci￿c case of emerging
countries crises, the empirical evidence clearly indicates that, while indicators of
fundamental weaknesses clearly explain a large part of the probability that a crisis
will occur, a sizeable non fundamental component remains (see Kaminsky (1999),
as well as the discussion of this piece of evidence by Chari and Kehoe (2003)). We
interpret such evidence as suggesting that both aspects (fundamental and ￿ extrinsic￿ )
are at work when a ￿nancial crisis triggers, and that both ingredients should be part
of any theoretical model trying to explain the recent crisis episodes in developed and
developing countries.
The present paper aims to o⁄er a model of this kind. We draw on Allen and Gale￿ s
(2000) (AG in the remainder of the paper) theory of ￿nancial crises, which in our
view best grasps a central feature of all recent crisis, i.e., a credit-fulled asset bubble,
followed by a market crash and the failures (or near-failure in case of government
bail-out) of the ￿nancial institutions that had borrowed to buy speculative assets.
In AG, ￿nancial crises are the natural outcome of credit relations where portfolio
investors borrow to buy risky assets, and are protected against a bad realisation of
the asset payo⁄ by the use of simple debt contract with limited liability. Investors￿
twisted incentives then lead them to overinvest in the risky asset (risk shifting),
whose price consequently rises to high levels (asset bubble), with the possibility that
they go bankrupt if the asset payo⁄ turns out badly (￿nancial crisis). While AG
focus on the ￿ partial equilibrium￿case where the total amount of credit available to
portfolio investors is exogenous, we allow the supply of credit to vary according to an
optimal consumption-savings plan by lenders. We regard this alternative assumption
3as not only more realistic, but also particularly relevant to the recent crises, where
the endogeneity of the credit supply was frequently blamed for being an important
cause of ￿nancial instability.
Analysing the interdependence between individual savings decisions by lenders
and the equilibrium return on loans to investors turns out to yield a whole new set
of predictions, which can be summarised as follows. Within a two-period model of
lending and portfolio choice, we ￿rst show that variations in aggregate lending to
investors alters the composition and riskiness of their portfolio, and thus the return
that are able to o⁄er in equilibrium, in a possibly non-monotonic way. On the one
hand, a higher level of aggregate savings raises productive investment, with the stan-
dard e⁄ect of reducing marginal productivity and the equilibrium loan return. On
the other hand, higher savings tend to aleviate the risk shifting problem by reducing
the proportion of investors￿resources that are invested in the risky asset, and thus the
average riskiness of investors￿portfolio. This second, non-standard e⁄ect goes against
the standard one as it tends to increase the per unit return on loans. Under certain
circumstances that we specify below, it is strong enough to more than o⁄set the ￿rst
one, causing the ex ante loan return to increase with the amount of total lending.
Coupling this phenomenon with a simple speci￿cation for the endogenous savings
behaviour of lenders, the possible increasingness of the loan return function creates a
strategic complementarity in lending decisions, which may in turn give rise multiple
equilibria associated with di⁄erent levels of lending, interest rates, and asset prices.
Importantly, the possibility that multiple equilibria exist is shown to be related to the
severity of the risk-shifting problem in the economy, such as implied by the payo⁄
risk associated with holding the risky asset. Finally, we show that these multiple
lending equilibria are unambiguously Pareto-ranked; the lower aggregate lending, the
lower asset prices (i.e., the higher interest rates), and the lower aggregate welfare.
A coordination failure may thus occur if lenders collectively choose a stable level of
aggregate lending that has poor welfare properties.
To go from a theory of multiple equilibria in credit and asset markets to one of
self-ful￿lling crises, our next step is embed the mechanism that we just described
into a three-period, stochastic model where the low-lending equilibrium is selected
with positive probability at the intermediate date. The interpretation of this event
is that a ￿ sunspot￿ , i.e. an extraneous signal on which agents coordinate their expec-
tations, lead them to believe that the community of lenders as a whole will select the
equilibrium with low lending at date 1. This event is associated with a self-ful￿lling
4liquidity dry-up, as lenders remove a large amount of funds from the portfolio invest-
ment sector, accompanied by a ￿nancial crisis, i.e., the failure of those investors who
had borrowed to ￿nance their portfolio investment. More speci￿cally, we show that
such crises have the following characteristics; i) lending to portfolio investors drops
down as lenders choose to consume, rather than save, a large share of their endow-
ment of goods, ii) this causes a fall in investors￿￿nancial resources and a drop in the
demand for risky assets, whose price consequently falls to low levels, and iii) this fall
in asset prices forces into bankruptcy investors who have previously borrowed to buy
them, as the total value of their assets falls short of their liabilities. To summarise,
￿nancial crises are associated with a sudden credit contraction, followed by a market
crash and widespread failures of borrowers. Importantly, such crises follow a rever-
sal of expectations on the part of lenders and are not restricted to situations where
uncertainty about the amount of available credit is induced by policy (as in times of
uncertain ￿nancial liberalisation, the example emphasised by AG). Again, and for the
same reason as in the two-period model, self-ful￿lling crises are more likely to occur
in economies where the risk shifting problem, and the associated excessive risk-taking
by borrowers, is severe.
Our model of self-ful￿lling ￿nancial crises also turns out to have interesting welfare
implications, which do not duplicate the welfare properties of the possible (determin-
istic) equilibria of the two-date model. First, the drop in asset prices that follows
the occurrence of the crisis at the intermediate date generates negative wealth e⁄ects
on lenders budget set, which forces them to cut their discounted consumption ￿ ow,
and thus their ex ante welfare, from then on. Second, the reduction in aggregate
savings that follows lowers productive investment, with the consequence of lowering
entrepreneurs￿consumption and welfare. Then, the higher the ex ante probability of
a crisis, the most likely these poor outcomes, and the lower the ex ante aggregate
welfare (from the point of view of the initial date).
Section 2 introduces the model and its basic credit market imperfection, namely
the existence of debt-￿nanced investors who have exclusive access to investment op-
portunities, but must borrow from utility-maximising lenders. Section 3 shows that
the expected loan return may increase with the total quantity of loans due to changes
in the composition and riskiness of investors￿optimal portfolio, and shows how the
resulting strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the loan market.
Section 4 extends the analysis to a 3-period model where the selection of a low-
lending equilibrium at the intermediate date, which occurs with positive probability,
5is associated with a credit contraction, a market crash, and a ￿nancial crisis. Section




Since our model builds on AG, we shall stick to their notations as much as possible
in order to ease the comparision between our results and theirs.
There are two dates, 1 and 2, and two real assets. At date 1 assets are bought,
while returns are collected at date 2. One asset, safe and in variable supply, yields
f(x) units of the (all-purpose) good for x ￿ 0 units invested, where f (:) is a twice
continuously di⁄erentiable production function satisfying f0 (x) > 0; f00 (x) < 0;
f (0) = 0; f0 (0) = 1 and f0 (1) = 0. Moreover, the following standard assumption
is made to limit the curvature of f (:), for all x > 0:
￿ (x) ￿ ￿xf
00 (x)=f
0 (x) < 1 (1)
The other asset is risky, in ￿xed supply (normalised to 1), and yields a payo⁄ R,
where R is a random variable at date 1 that takes on the value Rh with probability
￿ 2 (0;1]; and 0 otherwise, at date 2. The asset is initially held by a class of one
period-lived initial asset holders who sell the asset to portfolio investors at date 1
and then leave the market (see below).
Although more general distributions for the fundamental uncertainty a⁄ecting
the asset payo⁄ can be considered, we choose this simple one in order to focus on
￿ extrinsic￿uncertainty generated by the presence of multiple equilibria. Note that
multiple equilibria very similar to those analysed in this paper also exist if the risky
asset is in variable supply, so that its quantity, rather than its price, adjusts over time
to clear markets. The interpretation of the present speci￿cation is that the supply
of the risky asset responds slowly to changes for its demand (as it is the case for
stocks or real estate, for example), while that of the safe asset adjusts quickly, and
we analyse the way markets clear in the short run.
62.2 Agents￿behaviour
Besides the class of initial asset holders just described, the economy is populated
by three types of two period-lived, risk-neutral agents in large numbers. There is a
continuum of investors and one of entrepreneurs, both in positive mass, who do not
receive any endowment and maximise date-2 consumption. There is also a continuum
of lenders in mass 1, each endowed with e units of good at date 1, who maximise
U (c1;c2) = c1 + ￿c2; (2)
where ci; i = 1;2, is date-i consumption and ￿ > 0 is the discount factor. Moroever,
the following technical assumption is made about the value of initial endowments:
e > f
0￿1 (1=￿) + ￿￿R
h; (3)
As will become clear in the following, condition (3) is necessary and su¢ cient for
all the equilibria that we analyse in the paper to correspond to interior solutions (i.e.,
where both c1 and c2 are positive).
There is market segmentation (i.e., restrictions on agents￿asset holdings), in the
two following senses. First, only entrepreneurs have access to the production technol-
ogy f (:); Entrepreneurs￿utility maximisation under perfect competition then ensures
that the gross interest rate on corporate bonds, r, is equal to the marginal product
of capital, f0 (:). Second, lenders cannot directly buy risky assets or corporate bonds,
and must thus lend to investors to ￿nance date-2 consumption. These restrictions
imply that equilibria are intermediated, with lenders ￿rst entrusting investors with
their savings, and investors then lending to entrepreneurs and buying risky assets.
Given the assumed utility function, savings decisions by lenders will depend on the
comparison between the ex ante return on loans and the gross rate of time preference,
1=￿. The possibility that lenders consume rather than lend their endowment makes
individual lending decisions endogenous (i.e., contingent on the ex ante return on
loans) and is the novel feature of our model. Finally, we follow Allen and Gale (2000)
in assuming that lenders and investors are restricted to use simple debt contracts,
where the contracted rate on loans cannot be conditioned on the loan size or, due
to asymmetric information, on investors￿ portfolio. Perfect competition amongst
investors and absence of arbitrage opportunities then ensures that the contracted
rate on loans is equal to the interest rate on corporate bonds, r (see AG, p. 241)).
Call B the amount borrowed by investors, which they use to buy XS units of
corporate bonds and XR units of the risky asset at price P. The use of debt contracts
7with limited liability implies that investors￿date-2 consumption is:
sup[rXS + RXR ￿ r(XS + PXR);0] = sup[XR (R ￿ rP);0]
In other words, when the realisation of the payo⁄ is Rh; investors do not default




; which must be non negative. When the asset
payo⁄ is 0, they default on loans (since XR (0 ￿ rP) < 0 assuming the equilibrium
price si positive) and receive 0.
2.3 Market clearing
Since investors default in case of a bad realisation of the asset￿ s income, their expected
date-2 consumption is simply:
￿XR (Rh ￿ rP) (4)
Given investors￿objective of maximising expected consumption, clearing of the
market for the risky asset implies that its equilibrium price must be:
P = R
h=r (5)
If the price of the asset where lower than Rh=r; then (4) would be positive for all
positive values of XR and investors would want to buy an in￿nite quantity of risky
assets; If it were higher than Rh=r; then the net unit return on holding risky assets
would be negative and the demand for them would be zero. Since the asset is in posi-
tive and ￿nite supply, neither P < Rh=r nor P > Rh=r can be equilibrium situations.
Note from equations (4) and (5) that the competition of risk-neutral investors for the
risky asset in the intermediated equilibrium implies that their expected gain is zero
even when the asset payo⁄is Rh. Thus, investors￿pro￿ts and consumption levels are
zero for both possible realisations of R.
Using eq.(5) and the fact that in equilibrium XR = 1 and thus r = f0 (B ￿ P),
clearing of the market for corporate bonds implies:
f
0￿1 (r) + R
h=r = B (6)
The above equation de￿nes the equilibrium interest rate uniquely for all positive
values of B. It can then be inverted to yield the interest rate function, r(B). Given
the properties of f (:) speci￿ed in Sec.2.1, r(B) is continuous and such that r0 (B) <
0, r(0) = 1 and r(1) = 0.
8Equations(5) and (6) fully characterise the equilibrium price vector, (P;r); condi-
tionally on the amount of aggregate lending, B; The latter will in turn be endogenised
in Sec.3.2. below.
2.4 Fundamental equilibrium
The price vector (P;r) computed above is the one under market segmentation, where
investors are granted exclusive access to the markets for corporate bonds and risky
assets. In this context, a natural measure of the ￿ fundamental value￿of an asset is the
price that would prevail if these restrictions were removed, i.e., if lenders could directly
buy both real assets (in this case the risk shifting problem would be eliminated and
asset prices would be ￿rst-best e¢ cient, see AG, p. 244). Lenders￿expected date-2
consumption from choosing a portfolio (XS;XR), conditional on the amount of chosen













were rf is the value of the interest rate in the fundamental equilibrium. Given B,
the price of the asset in the fundamental equilibrium cannot be higher (lower) than





Using (8) and the fact that rf = f0 ￿
B ￿ P f￿
in equilibrium, the fundamental







f = B; (9)
where rf (B) is continuous and such that rf0 (B) < 0, rf (0) = 1 and rf (1) = 0.
Note from eqs.(6) and (9) that, for a given quantity of savings, B, the intermediated
interest rate, r, is higher than the fundamental one, rf. The reason for this is the
following; For that value of B the expected asset payo⁄ that accrues to investors in
the intermediated equilibrium, Rh, is higher than the expected payo⁄ to lenders in
the fundamental equilibrium, ￿Rh. Thus, risky assets are bid up in the intermedi-
ated equilibrium, safe asset investment, XS; is crowed out, which in turn raises the
equilibrium interest rate, r (with respect to the fundamental one, rf). The interme-
diated equilibrium is thus characterised by risk shifting, in the sense that portfolio
9delegation lead to an excessive share of risky asset investment, and too little safe asset
investment, with respect to what would be ￿rst-best optimal (i.e., the fundamental
equilibrium).
Substituting(8) into (7), we can see that lenders date-1 consumption is e￿B, while
(expected) date-2 consumption is Brf (B). Given lenders￿utility function (eq.(2))
and our assumption of high initial endowment (inequality (3)), lenders increase sav-
ings up to the point where rf (B) = 1=￿ (see ￿gure 1). From eqs.(8) and (9), the







0￿1 (1=￿) + ￿￿R
h (11)
In other words, lenders￿risk neutrality imply that in the fundamental equilibrium
asset prices, P f, are equal to the discounted expected dividend stream, ￿￿Rh; while
capital investment, X
f
S; settles at the point where its rate of return is equal to lenders￿
rate of time preference, f0￿1 (1=￿). Comparing eqs.(5) and (10) indicates that assets
are potentially mispriced in the intermediated equilibrium, since the di⁄erence P￿P f
may be di⁄erent from zero; The sign and implications of this mispricing are analysed
in Sec.3.2 below.
3 Multiple lending equilibria
3.1 Expected loan return
Given our assumed utility function (eq.(2)), individual lending decisions simply de-
pend on the gross expected return on loans to portfolio investors as compared with
the gross rate of time preference. Thus, we must start by analysing the way the
expected loan rate, ￿; varies depending on the amount of aggregate lending, B.
When investors do not default on loans, which occurs with probability ￿, they
repay lenders at the contracted rate r(B). When they do default, lenders gather the
residual value of investors￿portfolio, f0 (XS)XS = r(B)(B ￿ P): The (expected)
total amount repaid by investors to lenders is thus:
￿r(B)B + (1 ￿ ￿)r(B)(B ￿ P) = r(B)B ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)R
h;












which implies that the ex ante unit loan return, as a function of total loans, is:




Note from eqs.(6), (9) and (12) that the probability that investors go bust at
date 2, 1 ￿ ￿, indexes the distance between the fundamental and the intermedated
returns on savings, rf and ￿ . When ￿ = 1 the risk shifting problem disapears since
portfolio investors never default; The intermediated loan return function, ￿(B); is
then identical to the fundamental return function, rf (B); so that the intermediated
equilibrium becomes uniquely determined by eqs.(10) and (11). When ￿ < 1; the
distance between these two return functions, for a given level of aggregate savings, is
easily shown to be:
r






which is positive since xf0￿1 (x) decreases with x (by assumption (1)) and r > rf
due to the crowding out of safe asset investment (see Sec.2.4). Because the extend
11of this crowding out depends on ￿, the probability of a real crisis at date 2, 1 ￿ ￿;
measures both the severity of the risk shifting problem in the economy and the implied
distortion in the intermediated return on savings.
To analyse the existence and properties of the intermediated equilibrium(a) when
￿ < 1, one must characterise the behaviour of ￿(B) as B varies over (0;1). First,
note that ￿(B) is positive and continuous, and that ￿(1) = 0 and ￿(0) = 1:1
Although this implies that ￿0 (B) must be negative somewhere, the two terms in the
left-hand side of equation (12) indicate that, over a given interval [B1;B2] ￿ (0;1),
changes in ￿(B) following variations in B are of ambiguous sign.
The ￿rst term of the right-hand side of (12), r(B), is the decreasing interest rate
function characterised in Sec.2.3 above; An increase in B raises the amount invested
in the safe asset, XS, which tends to lower the equilibrium interest rate, r = f0 (XS);
and thus the average return on loans. In contrast, the second term, ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rh=B;
increases with B; This latter e⁄ect re￿ ects the impact of the total amount of loan on
the average riskiness of loans as the composition of the optimal portfolio varies with









In other words, the e⁄ect of aggregate lending on the loan return is a composition
of its e⁄ect on the equilibrium interest rate, r(B), and on the share of safe assets in
investors￿portfolio, XS=B. Now, use eq.(6) again to write the relation between safe
asset investment, XS; and aggregate lending, B, as follows:
B = XS + R
h=f
0 (XS) (14)
From eq.(14) and assumption (1) about the concavity of f (:), it is easy to check
that an increase in B raises both the quantity of safe assets, XS, and the share of
safe asset investment in investors￿portfolio, XS=B. In other words, even though an
increase in B lowers r and thus raises asset prices, Rh=r, the relative size of risky
asset investment, P=B = 1 ￿ XS=B; tends to decrease as B increases. This in turn
limits the loss to lenders in case of investor￿ s default and increases the ex ante return
on loans.
Given these two e⁄ects at work, the crucial question is, Are there intervals of B
over which ￿(B) may be increasing? Taking the derivative of (12) with respect to B,
1That ￿(0) = 1 can be seen by using eq.(13) and noting that r(0) = 1 and XS=B > 0.
12this is the case if there are intervals of B over which
￿r
0 (B)B
2 < (1 ￿ ￿)R
h (15)
When ￿ < 1 condition (15) may be satis￿ed if ￿r0 (B)(> 0) is small enough for
some values of B, that is, if the equilibrium interest rate is not very responsive to
changes in the implied level of safe asset investment, XS. This in turn is true if
f (XS) is ￿ ￿ at enough￿for the relevant range of XS, so that r = f0 (XS) responds
little to changes in XS. Using eq.(6), together with the facts that r0 (B) = 1=B0 (r)





Rh + XSf0 (XS)
￿2
Rh + f0 (XS)
2 = ￿ f00 (XS)
For XS 2 [X1;X2], which occurs when B 2
￿
X1 + Rh=f0 (X1);X2 + Rh=f0 (X2)
￿
,
￿r0 (B)B2 can be made smaller and smaller by decreasing the curvature of f(:) over
[X1;X2]; In this case f0 (XS) is bounded above and below, ￿f00 (XS) can be made
arbitrarily small, making ￿r0 (B)B2 as small as necessary for (15) to hold (provided
￿ 6= 1). Importantly, the larger 1￿￿ (i.e., the more severe the risk shifting problem),
the more likely (15) is satis￿ed, for a given interest rate function, r(B).
Since there may be several intervals of B over which inequality (15) is satis￿ed,
￿0 (B) potentially changes signs many times as B increases. In the remainder of the
paper, we shall focus on a particularly simple case of non-monotonicity by assuming
that ￿(B) has a single increasing interval, as is depicted in ￿gure 1 (all our results
are easily generalised to the case of multiple increasing intervals). To give a simple
example of a class of production technologies generating this property, Appendix
A shows that so looks the loan return function if f (x) is isoelastic, where ￿ (x) in
inequality (1) is a constant that is close enough to zero (formally, ￿(B) has exactly
one increasing interval if ￿ < (1 ￿
p
￿)=2, none otherwise).
3.2 Loan market equilibrium
The possibility that the expected loan return be an increasing function of the total
quantity of loans is an example of ￿ strategic complementarity￿(in the sense of Cooper
and John (1988)) in lending decisions, since the choice by other lenders to increase
savings may then lead any individual lenders to vary savings in the same direction.
Lenders utility function (eq.(2)) imply that they increase savings as long as ￿(B) >
131=￿, but decrease savings whenever ￿(B) < 1=￿; All equilibria must thus satisfy
￿(B) = 1=￿. We focus on symmetric Nash equilibria, where consumption/savings
plans are identical across lenders and no lender ￿nds it worthwhile to individually
alter his own plan. Then, our normalisation of a unit mass of lenders implies that
individual and aggregate quantities coincide in equilibrium.
Multiple intermediated equilibria. Figure 1 below shows how multiple crossings be-
tween the ￿(B)-curve and the 1=￿-line, when they occur, give rise to multiple equilib-
ria (this phenomenon is robust since there are in￿nitely many production functions,
f (:) and associated gross rates of time preference, 1=￿; that generate such multiple
crossings). Bl and Bh represent two stable levels of aggregate lending, i.e., where a
symmetric marginal move away from equilibrium by all lenders alters the loan return
in a way that favors the restoration of the equilibrium. The value of B where the
￿(B)-curve crosses the 1=￿-line from below is not stable and will not be discussed
any further (starting from there, an arbitrarily small increase (decrease) in B tends
to increase (decrease) ￿(B), triggering a further move away from equilibrium). In
both stable equilibria the ex ante return on loans is 1=￿, and lenders date 1 and
(expected) date-2 consumption levels are e ￿ Bj (j = l or h) and ￿(B)Bj = Bj=￿,
respectively.
Recall from the previous Section that an increase in B lowers marginal productiv-
ity but raises the average riskiness of investors￿portfolio. The low-lending equilibrium
is thus characterised by a high safe return but a high share of risky assets in investors￿
portfolio, while the high-lending equilibrium has a low safe return but a safer average
portfolio. Finally, notice that even though both equilibria yield the same ex ante
return on loans, 1=￿, they are always associated with di⁄erent levels of interest rates,











S; j = l;h denotes the level
of safe asset investment when Bj is selected. Then calling P j the asset￿ s price and
E (Y jj) expected date-2 output (in the sense of the total quantity of goods available




























In other words, the selection of the equilibrium with low lending raises the interest
rate, depresses asset prices, and lowers productive investment and future output, with
14respect to the equilibrium with high lending. (More generally, there may be more
than two stable equilibra if ￿(B) has more than one increasing interval, but their
properties are similar to the 2-equilibrium case, i.e., the higher B, the lower r(B),
the higher P, and the higher XS and E (Y )).
Comparision with the fundamental equilibrium. How do the intermediated levels of




computed in Sec.2.4? Appendix B proves the following inequalities:
P
j > P
f; j = l;h (16)
B
j < B
f; j = l;h (17)
Equation (16) indicates that assets are overpriced in both intermediated equi-
libria, i.e., these are associated with a positive bubble in asset prices. This is an
immediate consequence of the fact that investors, who are protected against a bad
realisation of the asset payo⁄ by the use of simple debt contracts, bid up the as-
set and overinvest in it (with respect to the fundamental equilibrium). The reason
why savings are lower in the intermediated equilibrium than in the fundamental one
(eq.(17)) naturally follows; Excess risky asset investment by portfolio investors im-
plies that, for any given level of savings B, the intermediated return, ￿(B), is lower
than the fundamental one, rf (B) (see our analysis in Sec.3.1). Lenders must thus
ration credit in the intermediated equilibrium (with respect to the fundamental one)
up to the point where the intermediated ex ante return, ￿(B); is back to the funda-
mental one, i.e., the gross rate of time preference 1=￿ (see ￿gure 1 again). Notice, as a
consequence of this analysis, that a ￿ double crowding out￿is in fact at work on XS in
the intermediated equilibrium. First, for a given level of aggregate savings B, bubbly
asset prices crowd out safe asset investment, XS, and raise the equilibrium interest
rate, r = f0 (XS) (see Sec.2.4). Second, lenders￿optimal reaction to the resulting
price distortion is to reduce savings, B, which lowers XS (and raises r) even further.
Welfare. The presence of multiple stable Nash equilibria in the loan market raises
the question of their welfare properties, and in particular that of whether they can
be Pareto-ranked. Because our economy is one with heterogenous agents, analysing
this issue requires computing the ex ante welfare of all classes of agents in each
intermediated equilibrium.
First, we know from Sec.2.3 above that investors￿competition for the risky asset
implies that they consume zero whether the asset payo⁄turns out well or badly; Their
15ex ante welfare is thus zero in both intermediated equilibria. Second, lenders￿date-1
consumption is e￿Bj; j = l;h, while their expected date-2 consumption is Bj￿(Bj).
Since ￿(Bj) = 1=￿, j = l;h, lenders￿ex ante utility is simply e￿Bj +￿Bj￿(Bj) = e
in both equilibria. Third, initial asset holders￿consumption and welfare at date 1 is
the paiment made to them by investors against the risky asset, i.e., the asset price P j;
Since P h > P l, they strictly prefer the high-lending equilibrium to the low-lending
one. Finally, entrepreneurs￿consumption and ex ante utility from borrowing XS
units of goods and investing them in the production technology is f (XS)￿XSf0 (XS),
which is increasing in XS. Since Xh
S > Xl
S, entrepreneurs also prefer the high-lending
equilibrium to the low-lending one.
That the high-lending equilibrium Pareto-dominates the low-lending one is not
surprising. In the low lending equilibrium aggregate savings are the farthest away
from the fundamental equilibrium, the crowding out of capital investment by in￿ ated
asset prices is the most severe, and so is the resulting output loss at date 2. Now, both
investors and lenders are ultimately indi⁄erent between which equilibrium prevail;
Investors because their competition for the risky asset prevents them from extracting
any surplus from their exclusive access to it, and lenders because in equilibrium they
earn the same ex ante return whether aggregate lending is high or low. Thus, the
welfare loss associated with the choice of the low-lending equilibrium at date 1 must
be borne by the two other classes of agents; Entrepreneurs su⁄er from the fact that
date-2 output is low (because date-1 capital investment is), while initial asset holders
su⁄er from the fact that asset prices are low (because the bond rate is high).
The strict welfare ranking between the two intermediated equilibria implies that a
￿ coordination failure￿occurs if agents coordinate on the equilibrium with low lending
rather than that with high lending2. We know analyse the implications of this possible
coordination failure in lending decisions in a three-period model where the low lending
equilibrium is stochastically selected at the intermediate date.
2For similar reasons, in the generalised model with n > 2 lending equilibria, aggregate welfare is
strictly increasing in the amount of total lending.
164 Self-ful￿lling crises
4.1 A three-date model
The previous section has shown that the risk shifting problem that arises under
market segmentation may lead, under endogenous lending, to the existence of multiple
equilibria with di⁄erent levels of aggregate lending, interest rates, and asset prices.
We now expand the time span of the model to demonstrate the possibility of a self-
ful￿lling ￿nancial crisis associated with the selection of the low-lending equilibrium
at date 1. Besides o⁄ering a stochastic version of the multiple equilibria model,
our model of self-ful￿lling crisis also has new welfare implications. In particular, it
predicts that lenders are also hurt by the crisis because it a⁄ects their total wealth,
and thus their discounted consumption and utility ￿ ows, negatively.
The model has now three date, 0, 1 and 2. Lenders live for 3 periods, and
face overlapping generations of two period-lived investors and entrepreneurs entering
the economy at dates 0 and 1. In the following we shall refer to ￿ date-t investors
(entrepreneurs)￿as the investors (entrepreneurs) who enter the economy at date t,
t = 0;1, and leave it at date t+1. The risky asset is now assumed to be three period
lived ￿it is sold by the one period-lived initial asset holders at date 0 and delivers its
￿nal payo⁄, R, at date 2. The safe asset is two-period lived as before, with x units
of assets invested by entrepreneurs at date t, t = 0;1, yielding f (x) units of good at
date t + 1. We assume that f() is ￿ at enough over one range of x so that the loan
return function at date 1, ￿(B), has exactly one increasing interval just as in the
two-period model (here again the model can easily be generalised to the stochastic
selection of one lending equilibrium amongst more than two, but we focus on this
simple case for sake of expositional clarity).
Lenders receive the endowment e at date 1 as before (where e satis￿es condition
(3)), and they now also receive e0 > 0 units of good at date 0. They derive utility
from consuming at dates 1 and 2, with a utility function identical to that of the
2-period model (eq.(2)). Because lenders￿derive no utility from date-0 consumption,
they entrust date-0 investors with their entire endowment from date 0 to date 1 since
the gross, expected loan return at date 0 is always positive. As will become clear
shortly, this simple speci￿cation for lenders￿savings from date 0 to date 1 implies
that the equilibrium price of the asset at date 0 is uniquely determined.
The assumptions that we are making have the simple purpose of ensuring that
17the intermediate date of the three-date model will display exactly the same two
possible levels of equilibrium lending than the initial date of the two-period model,
as we argue below. We can then straightforwardly work backwards equilibrium prices
and quantities at date 0, given the possible equilibrium outcomes at date 1 and the
likelihood that they actually occur.
We construct equilibria with self-ful￿lling crises by randomising over the two pos-
sible lending equilibria of the two-date model. To do this, assume that at date 1 high
lending is selected with probability p 2 (0;1), so that a ￿ sunspot￿causes lending and
asset prices to drop down to low levels with probability 1￿p. With this speci￿cation
for extraneous uncertainty about which level of aggregate lending will prevail at date
1, the three-date model potentially has a continuum of stochastic equlibria indexed
by the probability of a market crash, 1￿p. Since the asset price at date 1 is the asset
payo⁄ for date-0 investors, this extraneous uncertainty about asset prices creates a
risk-shifting problem at date 0 similar to that created at date 1 by intrinsic uncer-
tainty about the terminal payo⁄ of the asset. This causes the asset to be bid up at
date 0, with the possibility that a self-ful￿lling crisis occurs at the intermediate date
if the low-lending equilibrium is selected.
4.2 Market equilibrium at date 0
Our assumptions made so far ensure that the date-1 equilibria that may prevail in the
three-date model are identical to those of the two-date model characterised in Sec. 3.2
above. In particular, our simple speci￿cation for lenders￿utility imply that, provided
the solutions to lenders￿problem are interior (which is guaranteed by assumption
(3)), both possible lending levels at date 1, Bl and Bh, do not depend on lenders
income at date 1 (this can be checked by varying e in ￿gure 1 whilst maintaining
e > Bf). This in turn implies that, within the three-date model, any additional
income stemming from date-0 investment is consumed at date 1 and does not alter
the possible equilibrium lending levels Bj, j = l;h, and associated asset prices and
bond rates, (P j, r(Bj)), computed for the two-date model.
Calling (P0, r0) the equilibrium price vector at date 0, and (X0S;X0R) the portfolio
of date-0 investors, their net payo⁄ at date 1 is:
sup[r0X0S + PX0R ￿ r0 (X0S + P0X0R);0] = sup[X0R (P ￿ r0P0);0];
where, given our speci￿cation for extraneous uncertainty at date 1, P is a random
18variable taking on the value P h with probability p (i.e., Bh is selected), and P l
otherwise (Bl is selected). In the equilibria that we are considering, date-0 investors
default on loans when the asset price at date 1 is P l, but do not default when it is
P h. Their payo⁄ is thus XR
￿
P h ￿ r0P0
￿
￿ 0 with probability p and 0 otherwise.
Given limited liability and extraneous uncertainty about asset prices at date 1, the







Date-0 investors choose XR that maximises (18), while any potential solution to
their decision problem must be such that they do not default on loans if the asset
price at date 1 is P h, but do default if it is P l, i.e.,
P
h ￿ r0P0 ￿ 0 (19)
P
l ￿ r0P0 < 0 (20)
Asset prices. Given (18), the demand for risky assets by date-0 investors is in￿nite
(zero) if P h￿r0P0 > 0(< 0): Market clearing thus requires that the equilibrium price
of the asset at date 0 be such that P h ￿ r0P0 = 0, i.e.,
P0 = P
h=r0; (21)
which satis￿es inequalities (19) and (20). Here again the interpretation of this equi-
librium price is straightforward. The perfect competition for the risky asset by date-0
investors implies that the asset￿ s price must be such that they make zero expected
pro￿t. Because they make zero pro￿t when the realisation of the asset payo⁄ is P l
(i.e., when they default), they must also earn zero even when it is P h; This is exactly
what the equilibrium price P h=r0 ensures. Note, as a consequence, that the equilib-
rium price at date 0 does not depend on the probability of a crisis, 1 ￿ p; Because
date-0 investors are protected against a bad shock to the value of their portfolio by the
use of debt contracts, they simply disregard the lower end of the payo⁄ distribution
altogether (i.e., the payo⁄ P l with probability 1 ￿ p).
Since lenders do not value date-0 consumption, aggregate lending from date 0 to
date 1 is e0 provided the expected loan return at date 0 is positive (this is always
the case since, even in case of investors￿default, lenders get some positive repayment,
i.e., the value of the liquidated portfolio). In equilibrium we have X0R = 1 and
r0 = f0 (e0 ￿ P0). Thus, r0 is uniquely determined by the following equation:
f
0￿1 (r0) + P
h=r0 = e0; (22)
19where P h = Rh=r
￿
Bh￿
is independent of e0, due to the interiority of Bh allowed by
assumption (3). Equations (21) and (22) then fully characterise the intermediated
price vector at date 0, (P0;r0), given e0 and P h.
Asset bubble and crowding out. Finally, we show that the risk-shifting problem due
to date-1 extraneous uncertaintly and limited liability of date-0 investors implies that
assets are also overvalued at date 0, and that they crowd out real investment then,




0) the vector of fundamental prices at date 0, and note
that the date-1, fundamental asset payo⁄ in the 3-period model is the fundamental
asset price of the 2-period model, P f = ￿￿Rh (see eq.(10)). Application of the usual
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From equations (22) and (24), and the fact that P h > P f, it is easily seen that
r0 > r
f
0. Since f0￿1 (:) is decreasing, there is a positive asset price bubble at date 0.
Looking at the crowding out e⁄ect of this bubble, note that e0 being exogenously
given, the amount of crowding out that takes place in the intermediated equilibrium
is simply X
f
0S ￿X0S = P0 ￿P
f
0 > 0: The implied lower level of capital investment at
date 0 in turn lowers date-1 output, f (X0S), in the same way as date-2 (expected)
output, f (XS) + ￿Rh; was lowered by bubbly asset prices at date 1 (see Sec. 3.2
above).
205 The welfare cost of crises
5.1 The wealth e⁄ect of crises
The analysis presented in Section 4 consisted of extending the deterministic, two-
period framework with multiple equilibria to a stochastic, three-period one charac-
terised by a continuum of equilibria indexed by the crisis probability, 1￿p. In doing
so we paved the way for an analysis of the dimension in which these two models
really di⁄er, i.e., their welfare implications. In the two period model, lenders￿wealth
at the beginning of date 1 was exogenous (equal to e). Combined with the facts that
lenders￿intertemporal elasticity of substitution between date 1 and date 0 is in￿nite,
and that the ex ante loan rate between dates 1 and 2 is equal to the rate of time
preference, this meant that lenders ex ante utility was itself equal to e, regardless of
which equilibrium actually prevailed.
This is no longer the case in the three period model, because lenders￿wealth at
date 1 now also depends on the value of their date-0 investment, which is contigent
on the sunspot state at date 1. More speci￿cally, we now show that the stochastic
selection of the low lending equilibrium depletes lenders ￿nancial wealth of forces
them to cut their intertemporal consumption ￿ ow. In other words, the three-period
model takes into account the wealth e⁄ect of ￿nancial crises on lenders￿possible
consumption plans and implied utility.
To see why lenders￿wealth at date 1 is contingent on whether a crisis occurs
at date 1 or not, compute the way it is a⁄ected by the possible default of date-
0 investors. When these investors do not default, they owe lenders the capitalised
value of outstanding debt at date 1, r0e0. As lenders receive an endowment e at date
1, their date-1 wealth if no crisis occurs is simply W h = e + r0e0. When investors
do default, on the contrary, lenders wealth at date 1 is their date-1 endowment, e,
plus the residual value of date-0 investors￿portfolio, i.e, W l = e + r0X0S + X0RP l.
Using the fact that in equilibrium we have X0S = e0 ￿P0, X0R = 1, and P0 = P h=r0;
we ￿nd that lenders￿wealth, W j;j = l;h, conditional on the fact that a crisis occurs
(j = l) or not (j = h), is given by:
W
l = e + r0X0S + P
l (25)
W
h = e + r0X0S + P
h (26)
Obviously, the total quantity of goods at date 1 is the same accros equilibria, be-
cause initial capital investment, X0S, is uniquely determined. This quantity amounts
21to lenders￿date-1 endowment, e, plus total production, f (X0S); the latter being
shared between date-0 entrepreneurs, who get f (X0S) ￿ r0X0S in competitive equi-
librium, and lenders, who get r0X0S (recall that date-0 investors always consume
zero, as was shown in Sec.4.2 above).3
From condition (3) and inequality (16), we have Bj < Bf < W j, j = l;h,
implying that both possible levels of wealth give rise to interior solutions for con-
sumption/savings plans at date 1 where ￿(Bj) = 1=￿. If a crisis occurs at date 1,
then lenders￿wealth and savings are W l and Bl; respectively, while their date-1 and
(expected) date-2 consumption levels are W l ￿ Bl and Bl=￿, respectively; It follows
that their discounted utility ￿ ow from date 1 on is simply W l. Similarly, if a cri-
sis does not occur at date 1, then lenders date-1 and date-2 consumption levels are
W h ￿Bh and Bh=￿, respectively, yielding a discounted utility from date 1 on of W h.
Weighing these possible outcomes at date 1 with the probabilities that they occur,
we ￿nd that lenders ex ante utility (i.e., from the point of view of date 0) depends
on the probability of a crisis, 1 ￿ p, as follows:
EU
L (p) = pW
h + (1 ￿ p)W
l
= e + r0X0S + pP
h + (1 ￿ p)P
l;
which is decreasing in 1￿p, since P h > P l and e+r0X0S; P l and P h do not depend
on p. Note that it is the selection of the low lending equilibrium itself that triggers
the crisis which lowers lenders￿wealth and discounted utility. Thus, the utility loss
incurred by lenders when a crisis occurs is akin to a pure coordination failure in
consumption/savings decisions ￿rather than an exogenously assumed desctruction of
value associated with the early liquidation of the long asset, as is typically assumed
in liquidity-based theories of ￿nancial crises (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen
and Gale (2000)).
3There are two equivalent ways of characterising lenders￿budget set at date 1. Looking at wealth,
total wealth Wj is assigned to date-1 consumption and date-1 lending, so that, using eq.(25)-(26),
e + r0X0S + Pj = c
j
1 + Bj; j = l;h
Looking at the total quantity of goods that accrues to lenders at date 1, these are ultimately
shared between date-1 consumption, c
j
1; and date-1 capital investment, X
j
S, so that:




S; j = l;h
Since Bj = X
j
S + Pj in equilibrium, these two formulations are, obviously, mutually consistent.
225.2 Initial asset holders, investors, and entrepreneurs
The previous section has analysed the welfare cost of self-ful￿lling ￿nancial crises from
the point of view of lenders. The full welfare analysis of the three-period model, and
the potential welfare ranking of the many existing equilibria, requires computing the
way the crisis probability, 1 ￿ p, a⁄ects the consumption of other agents, i.e., initial
asset holders, date-0 and date-1 investors, as well as date-0 and date-1 entrepreneurs.
Initial asset holder. We showed in Sec.4.2 that the price of the risky asset at date
0, P0 is uniquely determined and independent of the crisis probability, 1 ￿ p. Since
P0 is the consumption of initial asset holders, their welfare does not depend on the
crisis probability.
Investors. From the analysis in Sec. 3.3 we know that date-1 investors get zero pro￿t
and consumption even when the asset payo⁄is high, due to their competition for the
risky assets hedged by the use of debt contracts. The same reasoning applies to date-0
investors, who compete for the asset at date 0 whilst being protected against the risk
that the asset payo⁄ turns out to be P l at date 1. In other words, the consumption
of both generations of investors is always zero, so that their welfare as a whole is not
a⁄ected by the crisis probability.
Entrepreneurs. We know from Sec. 3.3 that date-1 entrepreneurs￿￿nal consump-
tion is f (XS) ￿ XSf0 (XS), which increases with XS. Because Xh
S > Xl
S, their

























, which increases with p. Turning to date-0 entrepre-
neurs, their ex ante utility is simply f (X0S)￿X0Sf0 (X0S), where X0S depends only
on e0 (and not on p). Thus entrepreneurs welfare as a whole decreases with the
probability of a crisis, 1 ￿ p.
To summarise, neither investors￿nor initial asset holders￿and date-0 entrepre-
neurs￿welfare is a⁄ected by the probability of a self ful￿lling crisis at date 1. Lenders
are, because the crisis destroys their asset wealth and forces them to choose a lower
discounted consumption ￿ ow. Date-1 entrepreneurs are for the reason analysed in
Sec. 3.2 that low lending at date 1 reduces their date-2 pro￿t and consumption. Thus,
the lower the probability that a self-ful￿lling occurs at date 1, the higher aggregate
welfare.
236 Concluding remarks
This paper has o⁄ered a simple theory of self-ful￿lling ￿nancial crises based on the
excess risk-taking of debt-￿nanced portfolio investors. In our model, the interplay
between the amount of funds available to investors, the composition of their portfo-
lio, and the return that they can o⁄er creates a strategic complementarity between
lenders￿savings decisions, which may in turn give rise to multiple equilibria associ-
ated with di⁄erent levels of lending and asset prices. Expectations-driven ￿nancial
crises may then occur with positive probability as soon as the intermediate date has
(at least) two possible equilibrium levels of lending, and lenders￿coordination on a
particular equilibrium follows an extraneous ￿ sunspot￿ . We showed that such crisis
where associated with a self-ful￿lling credit contraction followed by a market crash,
widespread failures of borrowers, and low productive investment and future output.
Besides demonstrating that credit intermediation based on debt contracts is a
source of purely endogenous ￿nancial instability, the model developed above also
gives new insights into the potential welfare costs of ￿nancial crises. In our model, the
dramatic reduction in savings associated with the selection of the crisis equilibrium
at the intermediate date has two implications. First, it causes a reduction in lenders￿
wealth as the total value of their capitalised investment drops down, which lowers
their discounted consumption ￿ ow from the time of the crisis onwards. Second, the
credit contraction associated with the crisis causes a fall in productive investment
and output, with the consequence of lowering entrepreneurs￿pro￿ts and consumption
levels. Thus, both savers and ￿nal producers are hurt by the ￿nancial crisis, while
intermediate investors, whose risk is hedged by the use of simple debt contracts, are
left unharmed.
This paper has taken as an uncontroversial empirical fact the widespread use
of simple debt contracts in lending arrangements, and has just assumed it in the
model. Our current aim is now to analyse the ways it can be endogenised given
the underlying informational asymmetry, and to check how the risk-shifting problem
is modi￿ed under more general debt contracts, e.g., where the contracted loan rate
may depend on the amount borrowed. That simple debt contracts are optimal when
investment strategies ￿ in addition to asset payo⁄s￿are hidden to lenders has recently
been demonstrated by Povel and Raith (2004). However, it is not yet clear in general
how the risk shifting problem is altered by the use of optimally designed securities.
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A. Shape of the loan return curve when f (:) is isoelastic
With f (XS) = X
1￿￿
S =(1 ￿ ￿); ￿ 2 (0;1) being a constant, we have B (r) = r￿1=￿ +








where r = r(B) is the interest rate function characterised in Sec.2.3. From eq.(12),
￿(B) is increasing (decreasing) when r0 (B)+(1 ￿ ￿)Rh=B2 > 0(< 0), that is, when
1
(￿1=￿)r￿1=￿￿1 ￿ Rhr￿2 +
(1 ￿ ￿)=Rh
(r￿1=￿ + Rhr￿1)
2 > 0(< 0)
De￿ning Y ￿ r1￿1=￿ and rearranging the above inequality, we ￿nd that ￿(B) is
increasing (decreasing) when















￿(Y ) changes sign over (0;1) if ￿(Y ) = 0 has two real roots, including one
positive root at least. A necessary condition for this to be the case is that the
discriminant of ￿(Y ) = 0 be positive, i.e., the following inequality must hold:
1 + 4￿ (￿ ￿ 1) > ￿ (A1)




















Both roots are positive (negative) if 1 ￿ 2￿ > (<)￿. Combined with (A1), this







￿(Y ) is negative for Y 2 (Y1;Y2); and positive for Y 2 (0;Y1) [ (Y2;1). Since
Y = r1￿1=￿, this means that ￿(Y ) is negative for intermediate values of r and positive
otherwise. Using eq.(6), this in turns implies that, provided (A2) is ful￿lled, ￿(B)
is strictly increasing for intermediate values of B, and strictly decreasing otherwise.
Note that when (A2) does not hold then ￿(Y ) is strictly positive, and ￿(B) strictly
decreasing, over (0;1).
25B. Proof of inequalities (16) and (17)
Let us start with inequality (16). From eq.(5) and (10), the price di⁄erence P j￿P f =

























where eq.(12) and the fact that ￿(Bj) = 1=￿; j = l;h, have been used to replace 1=￿
by a function of Bj. Rearranging the latter inequality, we ￿nd that a necessary and








Using eq.(6), this inequality is in turn satis￿ed if and only if
￿
f





which is always true since rf0￿1 (r) = rXS > 0 provided B > 0 (see eq.(14)).
Let us now turn to inequality (17). Since ￿(Bj) = 1=￿ in both equilibria, we can







￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)R
h (B1)









or, using eq. (6) again, if and only if
rf
0￿1 (r) < (1=￿)f
0￿1 (1=￿)
rf0￿1 (r) decreases with r since f0￿1 (r) + rf0￿10 (r) = XS + f0 (XS)=f00 (XS) < 0
due to assumption (1). Thus, the latter inequality is satis￿ed if and only if r >
1=￿. Solving (12) for r(Bj) and imposing ￿(Bj) = 1=￿, the necessary and su¢ cient





= 1=￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)R
h=B
j > 1=￿;
which is always true since Bj > 0, j = l;h.
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